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Transparency and Accountability in the
Management of Oil Revenues in Ghana
Ransford Edward Van Gyampo
Abstract: This paper undertakes a five-year review of the management
of oil revenues in Ghana since the commencement of oil production in
2010. Using reports from the Petroleum Transparency and Accountability Index, official records from key state agencies, and interviews with
core individuals within the petroleum sector, the paper assesses the quality of transparency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil
revenue. It argues that even though some progress has been made in the
transparent and accountable use of oil revenues, more can be achieved if
certain critical bills are passed and proactive interventions pursued without further delay on the part of government and policymakers within
Ghana’s petroleum sector. These would help prevent both potential social
conflict that may result from a lack of information on how oil revenues
are utilised and the corrupt use of oil funds by politicians and people in
authority within the oil industry.
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In 2010 Ghana commenced full-scale oil production with an initial output of 25,000 barrels per day (bpd). By 2015 production reached approximately 102,000 bpd, and it is expected to hit 124,000 bpd by the
close of 2016 (IEA-Ghana 2015).1 Oil production commenced at a time
of rising prices. The spot price for Brent Crude was around USD 96 per
barrel in January 2011, reaching a peak of USD 127 in May 2011 and
another peak of USD 128 per barrel in March 2012 (Republic of Ghana
2013). Although the price remained above USD 100 per barrel in 2013
and the first half of 2014, it began to steadily decline from September
2014, reaching a low of around USD 45 by the beginning of January
2015 (IEA-Ghana 2015). Following a slight recovery during the first half
of 2015, there was a precipitous slide in prices starting from August the
same year.
Ghana’s total petroleum receipts in 2014 were USD 978 million.
Between 2010 and 2015, a total of USD 3.02 billion was received
(Republic of Ghana 2015). Of this amount, 42 per cent was allocated to
the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), 30 per cent to the Ghana
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), 20 per cent to the Ghana
Stabilisation Fund (GSF), and 8 per cent to the Ghana Heritage Fund
(GHF) (ibid.).

Review of the Existing Literature
Existing studies on oil in Ghana focus on how its discovery undermined
democratic practices and institutions (Manteaw 2010), the need to manage citizens’ expectations regarding the impact of Ghana’s oil (GyimahBoadi and Prempeh 2012), the sectoral impact of oil production in
Ghana (Asafu-Adjaye 2010), and the need to harness Ghana’s oil and gas
resources for sustainable development (Aryeetey, Osei, and Quartey
2014). In the course of research, no systematic study was identified in the
area of transparency and accountability in the management of oil
revenues in Ghana. However, experience shows that transparency and
accountability in managing oil revenues is critical for preventing conflict
and the resource curse (Manteaw 2010). This is the gap in the literature
that this study seeks to fill. Ghana has come a long way since starting oil
production in late 2010. While production volume has been limited so
far, there is abundant potential to increase it in the years ahead.
Prudently, the Ghanaian parliament passed legislation in the form of the
1

See further details at <www.myjoyonline.com/business/2016/January-28th/oilproduction-to-hit-124000-daily.php>.
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Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), which provides the legal
framework for the collection, allocation, and management of petroleum
revenue in a responsible, transparent, accountable, and sustainable
manner for the benefit of the citizens of Ghana.
Using reports from the Petroleum Transparency and Accountability
(P-TRAC) Index, published by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEAGhana), as the basis for research alongside interviews with key oil-sector
officials, this study attempts to track compliance with the PRMA by key
institutions in the management of Ghana’s oil revenue. It discusses the
relevance of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAI), explains
both the features and computations of the P-TRAC Index, and examines
how Ghana has fared in terms of transparency and accountability in the
management of its oil revenues.

The Relevance of TAIs in the Management of
Revenues from Natural Resources
The concept of transparency connotes a deliberate mechanism that ensures public access to reliable information in a timely manner (Kolstad and
Wiig 2009; Haufler 2010). Making such timely information easily accessible
to the public and all stakeholders is one critical method of making government accountable to all of its citizenry (Haufler 2010). There are several
international TAIs that act as catalysts for performance improvement in
the mining and metal industry (Acosta 2013; Collier and Hoeffler 2004),
including the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the Publish
What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, and the International Council on Mining
and Metals (ICMM). In Ghana, the Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI) regulates the country’s gold mining.
TAIs have a number of benefits. Indeed, without TAIs corruption
is less risky and more attractive. In addition, if TAIs are not present, not
only is it harder to use incentives to make public officials act ethically,
but cooperation is more difficult to sustain and opportunistic rent-seeking is more likely (Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Bellver and Kaufman 2005).
Islam (2003) argues that improved TAIs increase a country’s credit ratings, enhance fiscal discipline, and reduce corruption. Glennerster and
Shin (2008) also find an association between greater fiscal transparency
and accountability and improved perceptions of a country’s economic
conditions and economic growth. Generally, improving transparency and
accountability in the management of natural-resource revenues enables
the citizenry to effectively scrutinise the government’s management of
the resource in question and hold the government accountable for misuse.
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Access to information regarding how oil funds are used reduces derogatory perceptions that can easily spark conflict, especially when people
believe the funds are being embezzled (Sachs and Warner 1995). The government also benefits from being transparent because trust is built with the
people, while the people, meanwhile, can form realistic expectations based
on the provision of reliable and timely information (ibid.).
One key challenge the Ghanaian government faces with the discovery of oil is how to manage the sudden increase in the hopes and aspirations of its citizens (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012). One way to manage these expectations appropriately is to improve governance and promote the use of credible and independent TAIs in the management of
the resource (ibid.). The urgent need for a credible and independent TAI
to guide the management of Ghana’s oil revenue is critical given that
opacity and the lack of accountability in the management of naturalresource revenues are key triggers for conflicts in many African countries
(Auty 1998).
The P-TRAC Index is one major and independent TAI developed
by a Ghanaian policy think tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA).
Even though initial ownership and acceptance of this initiative was limited, given its lack of national appeal, the P-TRAC Index has gained
credibility as an independent barometer that seeks to effectively report
on transparency and accountability issues in the use and management of
oil revenues in Ghana (Republic of Ghana 2014).2 The usefulness of the
P-TRAC Index compared to the other global indices, therefore, lies in
the fact that it is a home-grown TAI developed by one of Ghana’s credible and independent think tanks, one that fully understands the local
context as far as issues relating to transparency and accountability in the
management of oil revenues are concerned.
However, the challenge is that some Ghanaians sometimes prefer
global TAIs to local ones and, thus, treat such local initiatives with condescension. In order for TAIs to be effective, an enlightened citizenry,
the willingness of public officials to comply with TAIs, and the existence
of credible sanctions to punish those who do not comply with TAIs is
key in making TAIs effective (Kolstad and Wiig 2009). Nevertheless, the
P-TRAC Index remains a credible local TAI for Ghana’s oil sector.3 So,

2
3

Even though the EITI exists for Ghana’s gold-mining industry, the P-TRAC
Index is hailed for its visibility and regular publication of its report and findings
in the oil sector.
Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 January 2016, Accra.
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what is the P-TRAC Index all about, and how is it computed? The next
section provides the answers.

The IEA–P-TRAC Index
The P-TRAC Index was launched in 2011, designed to promote transparency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil revenues
and to enhance the level of responsibility on the part of policymakers
(IEA-Ghana 2015). Published annually, the index provides both qualitative and quantitative indicators that are used to monitor four aspects
of the oil value chain – namely, revenue transparency, expenditure transparency, and contract transparency, as well as the management of the
Heritage and Stabilisation Funds.4 In computing the index, data is
collected with the aid of a detailed questionnaire on its four main
components:
1.

Revenue transparency (RT) – In measuring RT, the P-TRAC Index
looks at the availability,5 quality,6 and frequency7 of published reports, as well as the appropriateness of the institutional environment8 for the management of the oil revenue. The reports are ex-

4

Interview with Jean Mensa, Executive Director of the Institute of Economic
Affairs, 4 January 2016, Accra.
In measuring the availability of reports, questions are asked about the extent to
which reports on the management of oil revenues are available to the public.
Responses are scored from “0” to “5,” with “0” suggesting that reports are not
available to the public and “5” denoting that the reports are publicly available.
In measuring the quality of reports, two main questions are posed. The first
rates quality on a scale of “0” to “5,” where “0” indicates that the reports are
not easily understandable to the average citizen and a score of “5” means the
reports are very understandable. The second question rates report quality on
the basis of how comprehensive it is, with “0” denoting not comprehensive
and “5” denoting highly comprehensive.
The PRMA stipulates monthly, quarterly, and annual reporting for the various
agencies involved in the management of oil revenue. In measuring the frequency
of reports, ten questions are posed. Each question is assessed on a scale of “0” to
“3,” with “0” for no reports generated whatsoever and “3” for monthly or quarterly reports. The first question seeks to find out how often reports are provided
on revenue generated by the appropriate agencies of state in the oil sector. The
remaining questions elicit information on the frequency of reports on reserves,
production volumes, prices, exports, royalties, taxes, dividends, and costs.
In measuring the quality of the institutional environment, eight key questions
are posed. The first question assesses whether the policy, regulatory, and commercial roles in the oil sector are shared among separate state agencies on a
scale of “0” to “5,” with “0” representing no division of roles whatsoever and

5

6

7

8
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pected to capture the nation’s oil reserves; revenues from oil; the effectiveness of laws regulating the oil sector; and the governance and
activities of the GNPC, the main state-owned industry in charge of
the oil sector (IEA-Ghana 2015).
2.

Expenditure transparency (ET) – The main avenue for channelling the
state’s share of the oil revenues is through the budget in the form of
Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) (Terkpeh 2016).9 The
same approach used in assessing RT is used to measure ET. In this
regard, the index looks at the availability, frequency, and quality of
reports on expenditures undertaken from the oil revenues. How oil
revenues are spent is also critically interrogated, and emphasis is
placed prominently on the number and distribution of infrastructural projects undertaken, the extent to which they contribute to
poverty reduction, the role of parliament in ratifying these expenditures, and the role of CSOs and industry groups in the oversight of
the expenditure programme. Again, a 6-point scale is used and individual scores are averaged to obtain an overall average for ET.10

3.

Contract transparency (CT) – In determining CT, the index examines
transparency in the awarding of contracts in the oil sector by posing
a series of nine critical questions. The first question attempts to ascertain the existence of rules for the disclosure of contract information; this is followed by a question on whether such contract in-

9
10

“5” suggesting excellent division of roles. The second question elicits information about the existence of laws that cover the entire decision-making processes
of oil development, while the third question asks whether the government has
published this legislation. For all of the aforementioned questions, there is a 6point scale, where a score of “0” represents no legislation whatsoever and “5”
represents extensive and well-known legislation. The fourth question asks
whether the Bank of Ghana, the agency mandated to receive payments from oil
companies, has internal controls that monitor assets and prevent fraud. The
fifth question checks whether there is an external arrangement that independently validates the internal control mechanisms of the Bank of Ghana. The
next question enquires whether there is an independent audit outside the Bank
of Ghana, while the seventh question ascertains the role of parliament in reviewing reports on revenues accruing from the oil sector. Finally, the eighth
question evaluates the oversight and watchdog role of civil society in ensuring
proper management of oil revenues. As with the first three questions, a 6-point
scale is adopted for the five remaining questions, where “0” means none or no
role and “5” means a crucial role.
See the Petroleum Revenue Management Act.
Interview with Jean Mensa, Executive Director of the Institute of Economic
Affairs, 4 January 2016, Accra.
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formation is available to the public. The third question seeks to find
out whether the government provides and publishes contract information during the licensing process, while the fourth question
enquires whether reports on the assessments of the expected environmental and social impact of oil and gas projects are published.
Question five asks whether the authority in charge of granting licences and awarding contracts for oil production is independent of
the state-owned GNPC, while the sixth question asks whether the
licensing process is open and competitive to all interested companies. The seventh question enquires whether there are legislations
and licensing processes that limit the use of discretion by the authority in charge of awarding contracts. This is followed by a question on the role of parliament in ratifying oil contracts. The last
question seeks to determine whether there is an appeal process on
licensing decisions. These questions are scored on a scale of “0” to
“5,” where “0” represents total non-agreement and “5” represents
total agreement with the statement (IEA-Ghana 2015).
4.

Managing the Heritage and Stabilisation Funds under the PRMA – The
final set of questions relates to the management of the Heritage and
Stabilisation Funds, established by the PRMA. Four main questions
are posed here: The first seeks to determine whether the rules governing the funds, including regulations on how the instrument is
funded and rules for disbursements, are publicly available. The second asks whether the agency in charge of the funds publishes information regarding both how the funds are being used and their
performance. The third question seeks to determine whether the financial reports are audited, while the final asks whether the audited
reports on the funds are published. Responses to these questions
are scored from “0” to “5,” where “0” represents total non-agreement and “5” represents total agreement with the statement.

Tracking Transparency and Accountability in
the Management of Oil Funds
This section presents an analysis of the quality of transparency and accountability in the management of oil revenues in Ghana from 2010
through 2015.11 The overall P-TRAC score increased from 60 per cent in
11

The P-TRAC was launched in 2011, and 2015 marks exactly five years of oil production in Ghana.
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2011 to 83 per cent in 2015. This is indicative of progress in transparency and accountability in the oil sector. In general, there has been
steady progress in three of the four areas of the index – namely, revenue,
expenditure, and the management of the Heritage and Stabilisation
Funds. However, there was stagnation in the area of contract transparency. Detailed discussions are presented below.

Revenue Transparency (RT)
The P-TRAC reports from 2011 through 201512 show that the Ministry
of Finance published petroleum receipts in the Gazette and in at least two
state-owned daily newspapers on a quarterly basis, as required by Section
8 of the PRMA. However, the Ghana Revenue Authority has no data on
taxes collected from petroleum since production began in 2010, and it
appears that the political will to provide this information is lacking
(Republic of Ghana 2014). The PRMA is a major piece of legislation
contributing to the maintenance of transparency and accountability on
the part of government (Banful 2010), but the act alone is not sufficient
to guarantee transparency. Other bills such as the Right to Information
Bill (RTI bill) and the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill (PEPB),
could help give full meaning to the PRMA. The RTI bill allows the general public access to data held by national governments at a minimal cost,
barring standard exceptions.13 The PEPB includes, among other things,
several strong governance provisions, such as a public petroleum register
and, importantly, an open and competitive bidding process, which has
the potential to help Ghana achieve the best deals for its petroleum resource.14 Speedy passage of these bills would significantly help to improve transparency and accountability in the industry.
In Ghana, civil society has played a vibrant role in pushing hard for
RT (IEA-Ghana 2015). However, civil society must intensify its efforts to
educate Ghanaians about their role in keeping government honest in order
to ensure transparency and accountability in oil-revenue management.

Expenditure Transparency (ET)
Typically, the information provided in the budgets since 2010 includes
the total amount allocated to each of the four priority areas, while a list
12
13
14

The IEA did not publish a P-TRAC report in 2013.
See details of the bill at <www.parliament.gh/publications/36/629>.
See details of the bill at <www.reportingoilandgas.org/ghanas-petroleum-explo
ration-and-production-bill-steps-forward-but-room-for-improvement>.
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of projects is provided in an appendix.15 However, the information provided does not give details on the locations of the projects being undertaken, nor is information on the level or degree of their completion included (IEA-Ghana 2015). To be fair, it is understandable that providing
this amount of information may not be feasible in the budget documents
due to space limitations. To that end, a separate publication on revenues
accruing from oil and how it was spent is recommended. In 2015 the
Ministry of Finance published a “citizen’s budget”: the budget presented
in simple language.16 Unfortunately, there was no reporting on petroleum (IEA-Ghana 2015). The cause of ET would be better advanced if
future editions of the novel practice of rewriting the budget in simple
language devote some space to informing the public about expenditures
from the ABFA.
A key aspect of ET is assessment of the allocation, distribution, and
developmental impacts of projects funded under the ABFA. The 2015
PIAC report (Republic of Ghana 2015)17 states that the infrastructure
projects are spread thinly across the country and that many projects are
still incomplete, even after several years of construction. It is also the
case that the allocations to certain projects constitute a tiny percentage of
the total ABFA, which makes the possible developmental impact hard to
determine (IEA-Ghana 2015). In the view of the finance minister, every
part of the country must benefit from the investment projects being
undertaken with the nation’s oil revenue.18 However, the fact that
projects remain uncompleted is indicative of insufficient funding, poor
monitoring, or a combination of both. All these issues point to the fact
that the current method of allocating and distributing the ABFA is not
satisfactory and may not achieve the intended development impacts. In
the absence of a long-term national development plan to provide specific
direction on how the funds should be allocated, this study advocates the
formation of a committee with representation from all major stakeholders to work with the Ministry of Finance on an appropriate expenditure programme.
15
16
17

18

See 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 Budget Statements and Economic Policies of Ghana, available at <www.mofep.gov.gh>.
Interview with Cassiel Forson, Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic
Planning, 20 April 2016, Accra.
The Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) is a citizens-led statutory body established under Section 51 of the Petroleum Revenue Management
Act (Act 815) to provide additional non-parliamentary and independent oversight
over the collection and utilization of Ghana’s petroleum revenues.
Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 January, 2016, Accra.
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Contract Transparency (CT)
The outcome of this research indicates the availability of information on
some petroleum agreements (PAs) on the websites of the Ministry of
Petroleum and GNPC (IEA-Ghana 2015). However, the reports and information on these websites are woefully inadequate. On the issue of
awarding licences, the government currently negotiates in private with
interested parties and does not disclose information about the process (Republic of Ghana 2015). The reason given is the high risk of exploitation
associated with unproven fields that can best be addressed through negotiations.19 Even though there is no legal obligation for the government
to disclose the full details of contracts and agreements, the tenets of democratic governance require that responsible and accountable governments
“let the people know what is happening”.20 Given that corrupt deals
benefitting politicians thrive in opacity, there appears to be little or no
commitment to ensuring CT, which explains why the RTI bill has not
been passed as of 2016.21 This study recommends that, to further enhance
transparency in the industry, the government must disclose information
not only on contracts and licences but also on the criteria for doing so. In
this regard, the passage of the RTI bill into law would be an important
catalyst in promoting transparency and accountability in Ghana’s oil sector.

The Heritage and Stabilisation Funds
(Ghana Petroleum Funds, GPF)
The GPFs comprise the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) and the Ghana
Stabilisation Fund (GSF). The aim of the GHF is to support development for future generations after the petroleum resources are exhausted,
while the GSF is meant to sustain public expenditure during periods of
unanticipated shortfalls in petroleum revenue. Transparency in the management of the GPFs has been high.22 Over the years, information on
activities of the GPFs is regularly reported. This includes information on
the performance of the funds, regular auditing of the funds, and
publication of the audit reports (IEA-Ghana 2015).

19
20
21
22

Interview with Cassiel Forson, Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic
Planning, 20 April 2016, Accra.
Interview with Jean Mensa, Executive Director of the Institute of Economic
Affairs, 4 January 2016, Accra.
Ibid.
Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 January 2016, Accra.
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During the 2014 budget session of parliament, the Ministry of Finance sought permission to place a cap of USD 250 million on the GSF,
in line with Section 23(3) of the PRMA, which was subsequently approved by Parliament.23 In the Budget Statement for 2015, approval was
sought to raise the cap on the GSF in the first quarter of 2015 to USD
300 million. The excess funds were to be put into a sinking fund to pay
off government debt, and the remainder was to be deposited in a
contingency fund.24 Although the above decisions of the finance minister
do not contravene the PRMA, the minister’s discretionary powers are of
serious concern, particularly if no input whatsoever is sought from the
relevant stakeholders. The GPFs run the potential risk of being diverted
from the core objectives of the PRMA if the discretionary powers of the
minister are not constrained.

Summary and Conclusion
The discovery of abundant natural resources has led to strife in many
African countries, including Congo-Brazzaville, Nigeria, Equatorial
Guinea, Sudan, and Chad, for several reasons. These include the fact that
regimes have failed to manage revenues accruing from natural resources
in a transparent and accountable manner. This has often led to an incumbency advantage and political instability that have resulted in incumbent governments adopting more repressive policies towards the opposition (Wantchekon 2002). Ghana has come a long way since starting oil
production in 2010. Unlike other African countries, Ghana is fortunate
to have put in place the PRMA, which guides the management of the
petroleum revenues. In assessing the quality of transparency and accountability in the management of Ghana’s oil revenue, one can say
without equivocation that progress has been made. However, the success
of TAIs depends on other policies because TAIs are necessary but insufficient to reduce the challenges in the management of oil revenues. In
this regard, all policy proposals made in this study must be carried out
without further delay as a way of boosting transparency and accountability in the management of oil revenues in Ghana.

23
24

Interview with Seth Terkpeh, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 4 January 2016, Accra.
Ibid.
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Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht bei der Verwaltung der
ghanaischen Erdöleinnahmen
Zusammenfassung: Der Autor untersucht die Verwaltung der Erdöleinnahmen in Ghana während der ersten fünf Jahre seit Beginn der Förderung im Jahr 2010. Seine Analyse beruht auf Berichten des Petroleum
Transparency and Accountability Index, amtlichen Dokumenten wichtiger
staatlicher Stellen und Interviews mit Persönlichkeiten des Ölsektors. Er
konzediert zwar Fortschritte in Richtung auf eine transparente und verantwortliche Nutzung der Erdöleinnahmen, aus seiner Sicht könnte allerdings deutlich mehr erreicht werden, wenn entscheidende Gesetzesvorhaben umgesetzt würden und Staat und Politiker proaktiv und ohne Verzögerung im Erdölsektor intervenieren würden. Das könne zur Vermeidung
gesellschaftlicher Konflikte beitragen, die aufgrund mangelnder Information über die Verwendung der Erdöleinnahmen entstehen könnten, sowie
zur Verhütung korrupter Praktiken durch Politiker und Verantwortliche
im Erdölsektor.
Schlagwörter: Ghana, Erdöl, Öffentliche Einnahmen, Verteilungspolitik,
Gute Regierungsführung

